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“No one should be shamed for making the right decision for themselves. 
I would not tell any other girl in my situation what they should do. That 
decision is hers and hers alone. . . . This is my life, my decision. I want a 
better future. I want justice.” 
—Jane Doe, denied her right to choose an 
abortion while in federal immigration custody1 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2019; B.A., 
Spanish and International Affairs, University of Puget Sound, 2012. 
1.  After a Month of Obstruction by the Trump Administration, Jane Doe Gets Her Abortion, ACLU (Oct. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Seeking a better life, 17-year-old Jane Doe arrived at the Texas border after 
fleeing from her abusive parents2 in her home country in Central America.3 The 
United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) detained her and sent her to 
a detention shelter overseen by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).4 
Following a routine medical examination, Jane Doe was informed she was 
pregnant.5 She made the considered and conscious decision to have an abortion 
and made her wishes known to staff.6 Jane Doe not only obtained a court order 
declaring her legally competent to make such a decision for herself (required for 
minors under Texas law in lieu of parental consent), but she also managed to 
raise the funds to pay for an abortion and transportation to a clinic.7 In other 
words, ORR simply needed to consent to her temporary release so that she could 
obtain an abortion from an outside facility.8 Nevertheless, ORR refused to 
facilitate her transportation to an abortion clinic and instead forced her to attend 
religious, pro-life counseling.9 
With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Jane Doe took 
her case to the D.C. District Court and finally won a temporary restraining order 
against ORR officials.10 Following an appeal by the government, the D.C. Circuit 
Court ordered ORR to transport Jane Doe to an abortion clinic or allow her to be 
 
25, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/after-month-obstruction-trump-administration-jane-doe-gets-her-abortion 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2.  Brigitte Amiri, Access to Abortion for Young Immigrants in Government Custody, ACLU (Apr. 3, 
2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/reproductive-freedom/abortion/access-abortion-young-immigrants-
government 
-custody (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Jane came to this country . . . without her 
parents, who abused her in her home country. . . .”). 
3.  Bill Chappell, ‘Jane Doe’ Immigrant Has Abortion in Texas, After Battle with Trump Administration, 
NPR (Oct. 25, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/25/560013894/jane-doe-
has-abortion-in-texas-after-battle-with-trump-administration (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); Mark Joseph Stern, Undocumented Minor Jane Doe Finally Obtains Abortion: “This Is My Life, My 
Decision. I Want a Better Future,” THE SLATEST (Oct. 25, 2017, 11:52 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2017/10/25/jane_doe_undocumented_minor_obtains_abortion.html (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
4.  Renuka Rayasam, Trump Official Halts Abortions Among Undocumented, Pregnant Teens, POLITICO 
(Oct. 16, 2017, 7:05 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/16/undocumented-pregnant-girl-trump-
abortion-texas-243844 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
5.  Application for Stay Pending Appeal at 7, Hargan v. Garza (2017) (No. 17A655). 
6.  Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Millett, J., concurring). 
7.  Chappell, supra note 3. 
8.  Garza, 874 F.3d at 736 (Millett, J., concurring). 
9.  Brigitte Amiri, Jane Doe’s Ordeal Illustrates the Trump Administration’s Threat to All Women’s 
Reproductive Rights, ACLU (Oct. 26, 2017, 5:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/reproductive-
freedom/abortion/jane-does-ordeal-illustrates-trump-administrations-threat-all (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
10.  Garza, 874 F.3d at 736. 
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transported to a clinic immediately.11 The decision came just in time because 
Texas law does not permit abortion after 20 weeks, and Jane Doe obtained her 
procedure when she was more than 15 weeks pregnant.12 Afterward, she 
commented: “I made my decision and that is between me and God. Through all 
of this, I have never changed my mind.”13 
Jane Doe is one of multiple girls affected by the new administration’s “non-
facilitation” policy of refusing unaccompanied minors access to abortions.14 In 
Fiscal Year 2017, ORR received 40,810 unaccompanied minor referrals from the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).15 Girls make up nearly one third of the 
children in ORR custody and the majority (77%) of these minors are between 
fifteen and seventeen years old.16 
Women in the United States have a constitutionally protected right to obtain 
an abortion.17 This right attaches regardless of a person’s nationality, 
immigration status, or age.18 It is, however, limited when the person seeking an 
abortion is a minor due to her presumably limited decision-making capacity.19 
The right is also limited, as many other rights are, when the person seeking an 
abortion is detained in government custody.20 In these two realms, the 
government may erect certain obstacles to obtaining an abortion by balancing the 
person’s right to choose an abortion against parental rights or against penological 
interests.21 Nevertheless, a woman’s right to choose abortion is a fundamental 
 
11.  Id. 
12.  Stern, supra note 3. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Stacy Sullivan, Jane Doe Wants an Abortion but the Government Is Hell Bent on Stopping Her, 
ACLU (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/jane-doe-
wants-abortion-government-hell-bent (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that the 
director himself, Scott Lloyd, former senior policy advisor for the anti-abortion charity Knights of Columbus, 
has personally visited girls to coerce them to carry their pregnancies to term); Stacy Sullivan, Second Legal 
Battle Over Abortion Rights for Immigrant Teens Takes Unexpected Turns, ACLU (Dec. 20, 2017, 12:45 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/reproductive-freedom/abortion/second-legal-battle-over-abortion-rights-immigrant-
teens-takes (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
15.  OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN PROGRAM FACTS AND 
DATA (Jan. 22, 2018), available at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/ucs/facts-and-data (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
16.  Id. 
17.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the 
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
18.  Alexandria Walden, Abortion Rights for ICE Detainees: Evaluating Constitutional Challenges to 
Restrictions on the Right to Abortion for Women in ICE Detention, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 979, 982, 990 (2009); 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (“Constitutional rights do not mature and 
come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, 
are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”) 
19.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo., 428 U.S. at 74. 
20.  Doe v. Arpaio, 150 P.3d 1258, 1259 (Ariz. App. 2007). 
21.  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634; Arpaio, 150 P.3d at 1259. 
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right.22  The factor of age and the circumstances of detention may limit the right, 
but they do not eliminate it.23 
Courts have recognized that detained non-citizens have a Fifth Amendment 
Due Process right to receive adequate medical care.24 Minors who are “civilly” 
detained in immigration facilities are similarly situated to women and girls, both 
citizen and non-citizen, who are held in state pre-trial criminal detention or held 
by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.25 As such, minors detained in immigration 
facilities are entitled to the same access to medical care and abortion.26 
Moreover, adult women in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) are provided transportation to an abortion facility as a matter of policy.27 
When a detained, unaccompanied minor complies with state abortion law, the 
detention facility should permit her to leave to obtain an abortion, just as all 
incarcerated women are allowed to do, regardless of immigration status or age.28 
This Comment argues that girls in immigration detention facilities are 
entitled to the same constitutional right to an abortion that other females in the 
United States have.29 This right is meaningless when a person’s access to an 
abortion is unduly burdened.30 Therefore, minors who are in immigration custody 
should be provided the same access to abortion as women and juveniles detained 
in federal prisons.31 Every female in the United States has a right to an abortion, 
regardless of her age or immigration status.32 
Part II provides background on reproductive rights and abortion access in the 
 
22.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
23.  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642; Arpaio, 150 P.3d at 1259. 
24.  Vaz v. Skinner, 634 Fed. App’x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015) (acknowledging petitioner’s ability to seek 
redress for inadequate medical care while in immigration custody, though ultimately affirming the denial of the 
petition); Cesar v. Achim, 542 F. Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
25.  Walden, supra note 18, at 1012; Dahlan v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 215 Fed. App’x 97, 100 (3d Cir. 
2007) (asserting that the “District Court properly analyzed Dahlan’s situation as an immigration detainee to be 
comparable to that of a pretrial detainee” and that “[a]bsent a showing of express intent to punish, the 
determination [of a due process violation] will normally turn on whether the conditions have an alternative 
purpose and whether the conditions appear excessive in relation to that purpose.”). 
26.  Id.; Arpaio, 150 P.3d at 1259 (holding that “requiring a court order to transport an inmate to receive 
an abortion [does not] serve[] a legitimate penological interest.”). 
27.  2011 OPERATIONS MANUAL ICE PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS (Rev. 
2016), available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/4-4.pdf (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
28.  See infra Part IV. 
29.  See infra Part III. 
30.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2299 (2016) (“We conclude that . . . [e]ach 
[contested provision] places a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previability abortion, each 
constitutes an undue burden on abortion access, and each violates the Federal Constitution.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
31.  See infra Parts IV–VI. 
32.  See infra Parts II–III. 
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United States.33 Part III reviews the framework for determining the constitutional 
rights of non-citizens.34 Part IV discusses the changes to the DHS policy of 
providing detained minors access to abortion in addition to recent lawsuits 
challenging this policy, and explains why the new non-facilitation policy poses 
an undue burden to unaccompanied minors’ right to an abortion.35 
Part V addresses the concerns that allowing detained non-citizens to have an 
abortion will prompt a wave of pregnant migrant women seeking abortion 
asylum at the border and will further burden detention facilities.36 Part VI 
concludes that detained, non-citizen women (adults and minors) have a 
fundamental right to abortion before viability.37 A policy that imposes undue 
burdens on that right, such as requiring parental consent instead of a court order, 
mandating religious-based anti-abortion counseling, or refusing to transport a 
detainee to an abortion facility, is unconstitutional.38 
II. REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO ABORTION 
Women and girls in the United States have a constitutional right to decide 
whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.39 This right stems from the 
unenumerated right to personal privacy, which the Supreme Court recognized in 
Roe v. Wade.40 Since Roe, lawmakers have ceaselessly chipped away at women’s 
reproductive autonomy, erecting creative obstacles to abortion access.41 
Subsection A discusses reproductive autonomy as a privacy right,42 while 
 
33.  See infra Part II. 
34.  See infra Part III. 
35.  See infra Part IV. 
36.  See infra Part V. 
37.  See infra Part VI. 
38.  See infra Part VI. 
39.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the 
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that [one of] Roe’s essential 
holding[s], [which] we reaffirm . . . is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion 
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 
642 (1979) (“The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique nature of the abortion decision, 
especially when made by a minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster 
parental involvement in this matter.”). 
40.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
41.  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 651 (examining a Massachusetts statute requiring a pregnant minor first to notify 
her parents, then if neither parent consents, allow her to seek a judicial authorization, which could be withheld 
even if she were found to be mature and competent); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa., 505 U.S. at 844 
(examining a Pennsylvania law requiring, among other things, that women be provided with certain information 
at least 24 hours before they could receive an abortion and that married women must provide spousal 
notification).  
42.  See infra Part II.A. 
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Subsection B considers impediments to accessing abortion specific to minors and 
females held in government custody.43 
A. Reproductive Autonomy 
Reproductive autonomy has eluded women in the United States since the first 
wave of immigration to America.44 Although in colonial America abortion was 
legal as a way of restoring the regular menstrual cycle, women who bore children 
out of wedlock were punished with “fines, whipping, and public shaming,”45 thus 
the choice to have an abortion was not entirely their own.46 At the turn of the 
19th century, with a surge in immigration from Eastern European countries, 
eugenicists encouraged the reproduction of “fit” women—defined as white, 
native-born, middle class, and without mental disabilities—while pushing 
through legislation to forcibly sterilize women who were “unfit.”47 As recently as 
2010, California sterilized female inmates without their full and informed 
consent after they had given birth.48 
Institutionalized women are particularly vulnerable to usurpation of their 
reproductive autonomy, as are minors.49 Since 1973, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly affirmed a woman’s right to abortion, but it has also upheld 
increasingly severe restrictions on the right to choose.50 The medical decision-
making rights of minors are limited by the requirement of parental consent for 
many medical procedures.51 
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court distanced itself from the medical reasoning that 
drove the decision in Roe v. Wade a mere six years earlier, focusing instead on 
 
43.  See infra Part II.B. 
44.  N.E.H. Hull & Peter Charles Hoffer, Roe v. Wade: The Abortion Rights Controversy in American 
History 15 (2d ed. 2010) (describing the history of abortion law and practice during colonial times); Roe, 410 
U.S. at 132–42. 
45.  Hull & Hoffer, supra note 44, at 15. 
46.  Id. 
47.  REBECCA M. KLUCHIN & JANET GOLDEN, FIT TO BE TIED: STERILIZATION AND REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS IN AMERICA, 1950–1980 2 (2009). 
48.  Abby Ohlheiser, California Prisons Were Illegally Sterilizing Female Inmates, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 
7, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/california-prisons-were-illegally-sterilizing-
female-inmates/313591/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
49.  KLUCHIN & GOLDEN, supra note 47, at 2, 7; J. SHOSHANNA EHRLICH, WHO DECIDES?: THE 
ABORTION RIGHTS OF TEENS 33 (2006) [hereinafter WHO DECIDES?]. 
50.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see generally Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 
428 U.S. 52, 52 (1976); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475–76 (1977); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 
492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 886–87, 899 
(1992) (reaffirming the central holding of Roe, while upholding a “particularly burdensome” 24-hour waiting 
period and a parental consent requirement with an adequate judicial bypass procedure); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914, 946–47 (2000); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007). 
51.  WHO DECIDES?, supra note 49, at 33. 
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the Court’s jurisprudence surrounding children’s constitutional rights.52 Bellotti 
concluded that a Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent to an abortion 
for mothers under 18 years of age was unconstitutional because it did not provide 
an alternative procedure in lieu of parental consent.53 Roe relied on the protected 
relationship between doctors and patients to find a fundamental privacy right that 
the court did not limit by age or capacity.54 Bellotti eschewed the traditional 
framework of dealing with children’s medical decisions, which had recognized 
various exceptions to the parental consent requirement that transferred decision-
making authority to the minor or a third party.55 Instead of applying that 
framework to the abortion question, the Court ignored teens’ decision-making 
capacity.56 The Court gave preference to the parent’s interest in governing the life 
of his or her daughter,57 as it had done before, recognizing the fundamental right 
of privacy concerning parents and childrearing.58 The Court also recognized that 
requiring girls to obtain parental consent would deter many of them from 
exercising their choice and declared there must be a “judicial bypass” option 
allowing girls to seek declaration of their decision-making capacity by a judge—
without having to notify their parents.59 
The Court’s essential finding was that the law cannot presume that a minor 
who wants to have an abortion has the decision-making capacity to consent to 
such a procedure.60 Conversely, this holding stands for the proposition that a 
minor who wants to carry her pregnancy to term is presumed to have the 
decision-making capacity to consent to giving birth and probably motherhood.61 
Thus, all minors in the United States, regardless of immigration status, face the 
contradictory assumption that they are too immature to decide to terminate a 
pregnancy, but mature enough to decide to give birth and become a parent.62 
 
52.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979); WHO DECIDES?, supra note 49, at 49–50. 
53.  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643. 
54.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–66; J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Journey Through the Courts:  Minors, Abortion and 
the Quest for Reproductive Fairness, 10 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 3 (1998) (“[T]he Roe Court spoke in terms 
of all women—it drew no distinction based upon age or capacity.”). 
55.  WHO DECIDES?, supra note 49, at 45, 62. 
56.  Id. at 59. 
57.  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637; WHO DECIDES?, supra note 49, at 46, 49–50. 
58.  Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 242–46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is the future of the student, 
not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by today’s decision. . . . It is the student’s judgment, not his 
parents’, that is essential if we are to give full meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the 
right of students to be masters of their own destiny.”). 
59.  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647 (“[M]any parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and young 
pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particularly vulnerable to their parents’ efforts to obstruct 
both an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence 
of a legal right to seek relief in superior court provides an effective avenue of relief for some of those who need 
it the most.”); see also WHO DECIDES?, supra note 49, at 49–50. 
60.  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643–44; WHO DECIDES?, supra note 49, at 63–66. 
61.  WHO DECIDES?, supra note 49, at 63–66. 
62.  Cf. id. 
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B. Access to Abortion in Government Custody 
ORR is applying the same illogical restriction on Jane Doe; she is at once too 
young to decide to have an abortion, yet sufficiently mature to carry her 
pregnancy to term and be a mother.63 Jane Doe is not the only target of the new 
administration’s abortion policy for unaccompanied minors in federal custody.64 
Children who were fleeing violence and gang recruitment in Central America 
overwhelmed the immigration system in 2014, and they have continued to arrive 
at the border seeking refuge.65 During the first quarter of 2017, “at least 113,828 
immigrants were locked up in 180 different facilities nationwide—a 10 percent 
increase over that period in 2016.”66 
Many of the women who flee violence in their home countries have 
experienced sexual abuse at home or during their long journey to the United 
States.67 Unfortunately, the sexual assault does not stop once they arrive and 
many are abused either by their fellow-detainees or by immigration officers who 
are supposed to protect them.68 The government’s own inadequate supervision 
and medical treatment of these women may be the very cause of their unintended 
pregnancy, resulting in the need for an abortion.69 
There is no direct precedent concerning a non-citizen minor’s right to 
adequate health care while in immigration custody.70 However, circuit courts 
have found that in pretrial detention, while an individual is not protected by the 
 
63.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Her Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and 
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 5, Garza v. Hargan (Oct. 13, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-02122-TSC) 
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Memorandum]. 
64.  Amiri, supra note 9; Lise Olsen, Private Prisons Boom in Texas and Across America Under Trump’s 
Immigration Crackdown, HOUSTON CHRON. (Aug. 19, 2017), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-
texas/houston/article/Private-prisons-boom-in-Texas-and-across-America-11944652.php (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
65.  Olsen, supra note 64. 
66.  Id. 
67.  U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS., REPORT 
OF THE ICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CENTERS 116 (Oct. 7, 2016), available at 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/acfrc-report-final-102016.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review); Sarah Stillman, When Deportation Is a Death Sentence, THE NEW 
YORKER (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-
sentence (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
68.  Sexual Abuse in Immigration Detention, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-
rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/sexual-abuse-immigration-detention-0 (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Detained and Dismissed: Women’s Struggles to Obtain 
Health Care in United States Immigration Detention, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 17, 2009), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/03/17/detained-and-dismissed/womens-struggles-obtain-health-care-united-
states [hereinafter Detained and Dismissed] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
69.  Id. 
70.  But see Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 63, at 3 (“The Flores agreement is a nationwide consent 
decree that requires the government to provide or arrange for, among other things, ‘appropriate routine medical 
. . . care,’ including specifically ‘family planning services[] and emergency health care services.’”). 
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Eighth Amendment because she has not been convicted and sentenced, “the due 
process rights of a pre-trial detainee are at least as great as the Eighth 
Amendment protection available to a convicted prisoner.”71 Those pretrial 
detention rights include the right to adequate medical care.72 
Although it involved neither an undocumented immigrant nor a minor, the 
abortion case Doe v. Arpaio, in which a 19-year-old inmate sought a declaratory 
judgment and an injunction against Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, is 
nevertheless instructive.73 The Sheriff, according to an unwritten County policy 
that prohibited the off-site transfer of inmates for elective medical procedures, 
refused to provide transportation for Doe to obtain a first-trimester abortion.74 
Jane Doe was prepared to pay for the abortion procedure itself and any related 
security and transportation costs, but the Sheriff demanded she produce a court 
order to compel the transportation.75 
Because of the penological setting of the case, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
relied in part on the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Turner v. Safley to ask whether the prison regulation was “reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests,” which would excuse the impingement on the 
inmate’s constitutional right to an abortion.76 The penological interests asserted 
were the safety and security of inmates and others, the conservation of 
government resources, the limitation of the County’s exposure to liability, and 
the concern that prison officials not violate Arizona law.77 Ultimately, the court 
found the policy was an “exaggerated response” to the penological concerns and 
“not reasonably related to the County’s professed neutral objectives.”78 
It may be argued that because ORR holds unaccompanied minors in 
detention, it is entitled to the deferential Turner standard.79 But as the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly stated, immigration proceedings are civil in nature, so there 
 
71.  Higgins v. Corr. Med. Services of Ill., Inc., 178 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1999); Evans v. St. Lucie 
Cty. Jail, 448 Fed. App’x 971, 973 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiff’s] claims arise under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment. . . . We note, however, that ‘the standard for providing 
basic human needs to those incarcerated or in detention is the same under both [provisions of the 
Constitution].’”) (internal citations omitted). 
72.  Id. 
73.  150 P.3d 1258, 1259 (Ariz. App. 2007). 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 1262–63; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987) (The “Turner Test” considers the 
following factors: “(1) whether there is a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the 
legitimate neutral governmental objective advanced as its justification; (2) whether the inmates have an 
alternative means of exercising the restricted right; (3) the impact of accommodation of the right on prison 
resources; and (4) whether alternatives to the policy exist that would accommodate the inmates’ rights at de 
minimis cost to penological interests.”). 
77.  Arpaio, 150 P.3d at 1263. 
78.  Id. at 1267. 
79.  Walden, supra note 18, at 995. 
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is no need to apply a penological standard to ORR’s actions.80 Although 
unaccompanied minors are similarly confined to federal detention centers, their 
privacy right should not be subject to “the more deferential Turner reasonable-
relationship test” because of judicial characterization of immigration detention as 
civil detention, and not a form of punishment.81 The concerns are magnified by 
the lengthy detention of undocumented immigrants and the relatively short time 
frame for making abortion decisions.82 
ORR policy should instead be adjudged based on the Casey undue burden 
test.83 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the 
Supreme Court shrunk the zone of privacy it had previously recognized for 
women in Roe v. Wade, while simultaneously strengthening the state’s interests 
in promoting women’s health and fetal life.84 The Court held that if a law 
burdening abortion was enacted for “a valid purpose”—i.e., a purpose “not 
designed to strike at the right itself”—it was not constitutionally objectionable if 
the law had an “incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to 
procure an abortion.”85 Such a law burdening a woman’s right to choose an 
abortion is not an unconstitutional violation of her right to due process unless it 
imposes an “undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision.”86 The 
Court stated that a state regulation unconstitutionally imposes an undue burden 
when it has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.87 
III. MEDICAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF IMMIGRATION 
Additional questions arise when the person seeking an abortion is not only 
under government supervision, but civilly detained by immigration authorities.88 
 
80.  INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation proceeding is a purely civil 
action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or 
remaining unlawfully in this country is itself a crime.”). Cf. Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) 
(Brewer, J., dissenting) (“[It] needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is 
punishment. Everyone knows that to be forcibly taken away from home, and family, and friends, and business, 
and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment; and that often times most severe and 
cruel.”). 
81.  But see César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 1346, 1352 (2014) (“[D]eportation is considered nothing more than a physical manifestation of the 
nation’s sovereign prerogative to dictate the terms by which it admits noncitizens and allows them to remain 
within its borders.”). 
82.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 63, at 15. 
83.  See infra Part IV. 
84.  Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
85.  Id. at 874. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. 
88.  See infra Part III.A. 
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Non-citizens by their very nature are not entitled to the full rights and privileges 
that inhere to U.S. citizenship.89 However, as explained below, non-citizens have 
a right to due process, and a woman’s right to abortion is protected by her right to 
due process.90 
A. Immigration Framework for Constitutionally Protected Rights 
There are two major impediments to protecting immigrants’ rights: judicial 
deference to plenary federal immigration power and the characterization of 
deportation proceedings as a civil matter.91 Although courts have repeatedly used 
the doctrine of plenary power to afford great deference to the government in the 
realm of immigration law, they have also acknowledged that non-citizens are 
entitled to due process under the law while in removal proceedings.92 Here, a 
liberty interest is denied when a woman is refused access to an abortion.93 In this 
instance, access to abortion is so heavily burdened that the right is effectively 
eclipsed.94 
The Supreme Court has long portrayed deportation as a civil proceeding.95 
For that reason, several constitutional rights typically guaranteed in criminal 
cases have been denied to non-citizens in removal proceedings.96 However, 
detained female immigrants confront the same obstacles in accessing abortion 
that incarcerated women in the United States frequently encounter.97 The 
fundamental right to abortion should not be altered by the fact that immigration 
proceedings are construed as civil when the practical effect of a woman’s 
incarceration makes her a hostage subject to the decision of the agency holding 
her in detention.98 
Children who arrive alone at the border face additional impediments to 
exercising their rights, in part due to their age, language skills, and cultural 
 
89.  But see Developments in the Law: Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1286, 1445 (1983) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (“When the federal government or a state government 
threatens a fundamental right of an undocumented alien, courts generally accord her the same protections that 
they would a legally present alien.”). 
90.  See infra Part III.A. 
91.  STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 
134–35 (6th ed. 2015). 
92.  Id. 
93.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 63, at 9, 12. 
94.  Id. 
95.  García Hernández, supra note 81, at 1351. 
96.  Id. at 1356, 1389; Developments in the Law, supra note 89, at 1389. 
97.  Walden, supra note 18, at 1012; Doe v. Arpaio, 150 P.3d 1258, 1259 (Ariz. App. 2007). 
98.  See García Hernández, supra note 81, at 1414 (arguing that the characterizations of immigration law 
as a civil procedure and immigration detention as civil detention have never been honestly explained by the 
courts and that the distinctions are used as an excuse to combat the war on drugs more expediently). 
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understandings.99 In response to public outcry over the inhumane detention and 
treatment of a growing number of children who arrived at the southern border 
without documentation, Congress passed the William Wilberforce Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act to organize the processing and detention 
of the unaccompanied minors.100 The Act defined an “unaccompanied alien 
child” as: 
 
a child who—(A) has no lawful immigration status in the United 
States; (B) has not attained 18 years of age; and (C) with respect 
to whom—(i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United 
States; or (ii) no parent or guardian in the United States is 
available to provide care and physical custody.101 
 
The Department of Health and Human Services is responsible for the “care 
and custody” of the statutorily-defined minors (unless the child is from Canada or 
Mexico, is not a victim of trafficking, and is competent to withdraw her 
application for admission).102 Importantly, the statute requires that the minors be 
placed in “the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.”103 
The new administration’s policy of making every immigrant found to be 
unlawfully present in the United States a deportation priority (abandoning 
previous prosecutorial discretion guidelines) compounds an already 
overburdened court system that will soon “implode,” according to retired 
Immigration Judge John Gossart.104 Thus, violations of fundamental 
constitutional rights appear inevitable,105 especially given the administration’s 
twin aims of targeting government-funded healthcare (abortion access in 
particular) and undocumented immigrants.106 
The DHS convened a special investigation in 2016 to assess the various 
issues involved with family detention centers.107 The Advisory Committee on 
 
99.  Patrick D. Murphree, For the Least of These Brothers and Sisters of Mine: Providing Mental Health 
Care to Undocumented Immigrant Children, 15 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 65, 75–76 (2016). 
100.  LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 91, at 1159. 
101.  6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2). 
102.  LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 91, at 1159–60. 
103.  8 U.S.C. § 1232 (c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
104.  Retired Immigration Judge: The Courts Will Implode Under New Rules, MATTER OF FACT WITH 
SOLEDAD O’BRIEN (Feb. 25, 2017), http://matteroffact.tv/retired-immigration-judge-courts-will-implode-new-
rules/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (regarding the effect of the recent DHS memo on 
the immigration judiciary: “Our courts are dysfunctional, I think they would implode. Due process, as we know 
it, fundamental fairness, can’t be adhered to with all the pressure on the judges to hear these cases as 
expeditiously as possible and resolve them.”). 
105.  Amiri, supra note 9. 
106.  Id. 
107.  REPORT OF THE ICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CENTERS, supra note 67, at 
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Family Residential Centers concluded that current provision of medical care to 
detained non-citizens and to women and children especially is inadequate and 
demands immediate attention.108 
A woman’s right to have an abortion is protected by the right to privacy.109 
The Due Process Clause states that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”110 Because the Fifth 
Amendment extends this promise to all persons, citizens and non-citizens alike 
are entitled to protection when deprived of a right to privacy.111 The denial of a 
woman’s fundamental right to choose abortion constitutes a deprivation of 
liberty, triggering due process protection.112 Under the Mathews v. Eldridge due 
process test, courts traditionally balance three factors to determine what process 
is due: 
 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.113 
 
The individual’s privacy interest in choosing whether or not to carry a 
pregnancy to term cannot be denied to non-citizen minors as a class unless the 
government has some compelling interest.114 Any interest the federal government 
has in ensuring the welfare of the detained minor is slim when a state judge has 
declared she is competent to determine her own best interest regarding her 
pregnancy.115 The risk of erroneous deprivation of the minor’s interest is 
extremely high because ORR is exercising a “unilateral[] veto” over minors’ 
 
116. 
108.  Id.; see also Detained and Dismissed, supra note 68, at 68 (showing that this problem has existed 
for several years, even if it is only now demanding national attention). 
109.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the 
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
110.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
111.  Cf. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 91, at 135; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 18 U.S. 356, 369 
(1886); Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228, 234–38 (1896). 
112.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. 
113.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
114.  See Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 63, at 9. 
115.  Id. 
2019 / Office of Refugee Resettlement’s Unconstitutional Abortion Policy for 
Minors 
502 
reproductive autonomy.116 This absolute and arbitrary veto is precisely what the 
Supreme Court has found to be unconstitutional.117 Thus, a minor’s privacy right 
clearly outweighs the government’s interest in maintaining a policy of non-
facilitation.118 
B. Government Treatment of Unaccompanied Minors 
The outlook for the federal government recognizing the constitutional rights 
of female immigrants to have an abortion is bleak, given the new 
administration’s harsh treatment of immigrants in other respects.119 
Unaccompanied minors faced increased vitriol and legal obstacles from former 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions.120 In 2017, Sessions warned a gathering of law 
enforcement officials that unaccompanied minors have taken advantage of the 
immigration system and often turn out to be “wolves in sheep’s clothing,” 
implying they are often gang members themselves instead of the victims of gang 
violence they claim to be.121 
The government is fighting unaccompanied minors on several fronts.122 For 
over two decades, the treatment of minors in immigration custody was governed 
by the “Flores Settlement.”123 The settlement set the minimum acceptable 
standards for how detention facilities handled the detention and release of 
children.124 A class of minors in federal custody sued the government to enforce 
 
116.  Garza v. Hargan, No. 17-CV-02122 (TSC), 2017 WL 6462270, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 2017), 
appeal dismissed, No. 17-5276, 2017 WL 6522466 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2017). 
117.  Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
118.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 63, at 10. 
119.  See Veronica Stracqualursi, Chief of Staff Kelly Suggests Undocumented Immigrants Who Didn’t 
Sign up for DACA Were ‘Too Afraid’ or ‘Too Lazy,’ CNN (Feb. 6, 2018, 7:17 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/06/politics/john-kelly-daca-deadline/index.html (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (relaying White House Chief of Staff John Kelly’s recent comments that Dreamers 
who qualified for DACA, but did not apply “needed to get off the couch,” and that while “some would say were 
too afraid to sign up, others would say were too lazy to get off their asses, but they didn’t sign up.”); see also 
Josh Dawsey, Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from ‘Shithole’ Countries, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacks-protections-for-immigrants-from-shithole-count 
ries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/11/bfc0725c-f711-11e7-91af-31ac729add94_story.html?noredirect=on&ut 
m_term=.fcf1f51d4784 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
120.  Lauren Dezenski, Sessions: Many Unaccompanied Minors Are ‘Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing,’ 
POLITICO (Sept. 21, 2017, 6:19 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/21/jeff-sessions-border-
unaccompanied-minors-wolves-242991 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
121.  Id. 
122.  See generally Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2017). 
123.  Id.; IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., PRACTICE ALERT ON FLORES V. SESSIONS: NINTH CIRCUIT 
HOLDS THAT ALL DETAINED CHILDREN HAVE THE RIGHT TO A BOND HEARING (Jul. 2017), available at 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/flores_v._sessions_practice_alert_final.pdf [hereinafter PRACTI 
CE ALERT ON FLORES V. SESSIONS] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
124.  Id. 
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the consent decree.125 They alleged the government had breached the consent 
decree by instead following a “no-release” policy for Central American migrants 
and detaining children in unlicensed facilities.126 The government argued that 
because the former Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) was 
restructured since the Flores Settlement, and the responsibility for 
unaccompanied minors has transferred to ORR, the Flores Settlement no longer 
afforded children the same procedural protections.127 
But in July 2017, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the continuing validity of the 
Flores Settlement and secured the right of unaccompanied minors to have a bond 
redetermination hearing before an Immigration Judge.128 This victory for 
unaccompanied minors in ORR detention bolsters their claim to reproductive 
justice and rights.129 Because ORR under Scott Lloyd’s direction is unlikely to 
change its policy, the unaccompanied minors who live in fear in detention centers 
across the country must rely on the courts to protect their basic and fundamental 
rights.130 
C. Human Right to Health 
The right to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health” appears in the World Health Organization’s 1946 Constitution and 
in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.131 Since at least 2007, 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) has documented the lack of adequate health care 
provided to people detained by immigration authorities.132 The organization 
continues to report that “[m]edical care in the detention system, today, however, 
remains jail-like, decentralized, and dysfunctional.”133 
 
125.  Flores, 862 F.3d at 864. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. at 867. 
128.  Id. at 881; PRACTICE ALERT ON FLORES V. SESSIONS, supra note 123. 
129.  See generally Flores, 862 F.3d at 863. 
130.  See Bernie Pazanowski & Perry Cooper, Trump Policy Against Immigrant Teen Abortions Put on 
Hold, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 2, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/trump-policy-against-
immigrant-teen-abortions-put-on-hold-1?context=article-related (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (noting after District Judge Tanya Chutkan issued a preliminary injunction on March 30, 2018, “[t]he 
Trump Administration’s policy of refusing to facilitate abortions for unaccompanied immigrant teenagers held 
in government facilities has been put on hold.”).  
131.  G.A. Res. 217 (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights. art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948); OFF. OF THE 
U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH FACT SHEET NO. 31 1 (June 2008). 
132.  Systemic Indifference: Dangerous & Substandard Medical Care in US Immigration Detention, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 15 (May 8, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/05/08/systemic-
indifference/dangerous-substandard-medical-care-us-immigration-detention (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (explaining in 2007, HRW reported on the inadequate treatment provided to detainees 
diagnosed with HIV/AIDS; in 2009, HRW documented the failure of ICE to respond to women’s medical 
problems; in 2010, HRW revealed the harsh conditions of confinement for people with mental disabilities; and 
in 2016, HRW reported on the substandard medical treatment of transgender women). 
133.  Id. at 16. 
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On September 26, 2017, several civil rights and immigrants’ rights groups 
filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Homeland Security, on 
behalf of currently and formerly pregnant women in immigration custody.134 The 
groups allege that recent DHS actions demonstrate “a disturbing trend of ICE 
officials unjustifiably denying or delaying the release of pregnant women as well 
as their failure to provide the necessary medical care.”135 The mistreatment of 
pregnant women in immigration custody and the provision of inadequate medical 
care is a trend that affects women and girls in both ORR and ICE detention 
facilities.136 
 IV. ORR’S NON-FACILITATION POLICY IMPOSES AN UNDUE BURDEN ON 
DETAINED MINORS’ RIGHT TO ACCESS ABORTION 
In the context of the ORR’s non-facilitation policy, the provision of medical 
care is not only inadequate, but it also imposes an undue burden on the rights of 
minors to access an abortion facility.137 
A. Women in Federal Custody 
Under the Obama administration, both ICE and ORR had a policy of 
covering the cost of abortion in the case of rape, incest, and for the health of the 
mother.138 In all other cases of “elective” abortion, the government would 
provide transportation at no cost to women in immigration detention facilities.139 
This policy is still used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which “assumes all 
costs associated with the abortion procedure only when the life of the mother 
would be endangered if the fetus is carried to term, or in the case of rape or 
incest.”140 Regardless of whether or not the Bureau funds the procedure, the 
Bureau may cover the costs of  escorting the inmate to an outside abortion 
facility.141 
Between December 2017 and April 2018, ICE alone detained 506 pregnant 
 
134.  ACLU ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT RE: U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT’S DETENTION AND TREATMENT OF PREGNANT WOMEN 1 (Sept. 26, 2017). 
135.  Id. at 5. 
136.  Id. 
137.  See infra Part IV.B. 
138.  Rayasam, supra note 4. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Compare FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, FEMALE OFFENDER MANUAL (Nov. 23, 2016), available at 
https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5200.02.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review), with 
U.S. IMMIGRATIONS AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS (2011, 
Rev. 2016), available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011r2016.pdf (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
141.  PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS, supra note 140. 
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women.142 Compare that to the 292 pregnant women held in ICE custody 
between January and May 2017.143 Another policy shift accounts for the sharp 
increase.144 Before December 2017, ICE had a policy of not detaining pregnant 
women unless they posed a flight risk.145 But to bring DHS in line with the 
mandate of Executive Order 13768, ICE announced it would dispense with the 
non-detention presumption and instead determine whether or not to detain 
pregnant women on a case-by-case basis.146 Current immigration detention policy 
jeopardizes the reproductive autonomy of migrant women and girls.147 
B. ORR Policy 
The unwritten ORR policy provides neither funding nor transportation to 
detained unaccompanied minors who request an abortion.148 It also subjects girls 
to religious pro-life counseling, even after they have complied with the state law 
judicial bypass procedure.149 The government defended its new non-facilitation 
policy on abortion when Jane Doe filed for a Temporary Restraining Order and 
Injunction in federal court.150 Surprisingly, the Department of Justice (DOJ) did 
not argue in the District Court that Jane Doe had no constitutional right to an 
abortion.151 Rather, the government proceeded on the assumption that even if she 
did have such a right, ORR had an overriding interest in protecting minors’ best 
interests and was thus not creating an undue burden by refusing to provide 
transportation.152 
ORR argues thus new policy leaves minors like Jane Doe with two simple 
 
142.  Liz Jones, Pregnant and Detained, NPR (Apr. 6, 2018, 9:29 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/05 
/599802820/pregnant-and-detained (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. 
146.  FAQs: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainees, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENF’T (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/faqs-identification-and-monitoring-pregnant-detainees (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) 
(mandating that immigration enforcement authorities prioritize removal of not only removable persons who 
have been convicted of an offense, but also those who “[h]ave been charged with any criminal offense, where 
such charge has not been resolved.”). 
147.  Amiri, supra note 9. 
148.  U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE DIRECTIVE 11032.3: IDENTIFICATION AND 
MONITORING OF PREGNANT DETAINEES (Dec. 14, 2017); FAQs: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant 
Detainees, supra note 146. 
149.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 63, at 7. 
150.  Garza v. Hargan Oral Argument, C-SPAN (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?436060-
1/dc-circuit-court-hears-undocumented-teen-detainee-abortion-case-audio-only [hereinafter Oral Argument] (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
151.  Id. 
152.  Id.; Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Millett, J., concurring). 
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alternatives: return to their home country (from whence Jane Doe153 and most 
girls escaped physical, emotional, or sexual abuse,154 and where abortion is 
illegal for most girls,155 including Jane Doe)156 and give up on any claim they 
may have to remain in the United States, or be released to a sponsor who may or 
may not facilitate their access to an abortion, thereby defeating the purpose of the 
judicial bypass already granted to Jane Doe.157 
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, who filed an amicus brief in the case, 
expressed the conservative view that undocumented immigrants have no 
“constitutional right to abortion on demand.”158 He further hyperbolized that if 
Doe won her case, Texas may devolve into a “sanctuary state for abortions.”159 
The dissenting judges shared these fears and criticized the majority for 
recognizing “a constitutional principle as novel as it is wrong: a new right for 
unlawful immigrant minors in U.S. Government detention to obtain immediate 
abortion on demand.”160 
The DOJ distinguished the situation of incarcerated women who have a 
constitutional right to abortion that is protected by the prison.161 There is no other 
option for these women; they cannot simply leave prison and go to another state 
or country, nor can they be released to a sponsor.162 
However, waiting for the assignment of a sponsor is an inadequate 
alternative because this can cause a significant delay.163 According to ORR, the 
 
153.  Jennifer Chou, The Freedom to Choose: Our Fight for Jane Doe, ACLU NEWS (ACLU of N. Cal.), 
Winter 2018, at 7 (“Jane Doe entered the United States without her parents, who abused her in her home 
country.”). 
154.  Valeria Luiselli, Riding ‘The Beast’: Child Migrants Reveal Full Horror of Their Journeys to 
America, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/oct/05/riding-the-beast-
child-migrants-reveal-full-horror-of-their-journeys-to-us (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(noting that “80% of the women and girls who cross Mexico to get to the US border are raped on the way.”). 
155.  Abortion in Latin America and the Caribbean: Legal Status of Abortion, ALAN GUTTMACHER INST. 
(Aug. 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/ib_aww-latin-america.pdf (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that in El Salvador and Honduras, abortion in any form is 
illegal, and in Guatemala, abortion is permitted only to save the life of the mother); OFFICE OF REFUGEE 
RESETTLEMENT: UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN PROGRAM FACTS AND DATA, supra note 15 (noting that 
half of all unaccompanied minors come from Honduras and El Salvador, while 45% are from Guatemala). 
156.  Garza, 874 F.3d at 736 (Millett, J., concurring). 
157.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 63, at 4, 10; Garza, 874 F.3d at 736 (Millett, J., concurring). 
158.  Ken Paxton, AG Paxton: Texas Must Not Become a Sanctuary State for Abortions, TX. ATT’Y GEN. 
WEBPAGE (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-texas-must-not-
become-a-sanctuary-state-for-abortions (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
159.  Id. 
160.  Garza, 874 F.3d at 752 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
161.  Oral Argument, supra note 150. 
162.  Id. 
163.  See Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863, 872 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that “ORR currently detains 
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average length of stay for unaccompanied minors in Fiscal Year 2017 was 41 
days (nearly a month and a half); a significant length of time given the urgent 
nature of the need to terminate a pregnancy.164 Relying on a sponsor to provide 
access to an abortion is uncertain because the sponsor may similarly deny the 
minor access to abortion.165 What is more, the burden of finding a sponsor is on 
ORR, not the pregnant minor, and any undue delay in locating an appropriate 
sponsor should not penalize the girl seeking a timely abortion.166 
Likewise, agreeing to voluntarily depart is not an adequate remedy because 
in doing so the minor would be forced to give up whatever right or claim to 
remain in the United States she may have had.167 The government is correct in 
distinguishing the different situations of incarcerated women who are physically 
and legally incapable of leaving the prison to obtain an abortion.168 Nevertheless, 
the most important distinction is that those women had their day in court and 
were convicted; here, unaccompanied minors await their day in court while in 
ORR custody.169 
Moreover, the Supreme Court clearly stated that when the government 
requires a minor to obtain parental consent to have an abortion, it must provide 
“an adequate judicial bypass procedure” as an alternative way for the minor to 
exercise her right to choose an abortion.170 ORR raised a “substantial obstacle”  
by overriding a state judge’s determination of the minor’s decision-making 
capacity.171 Furthermore, abortion is illegal in nearly all circumstances 
throughout Central America,172 including Jane Doe’s home country.173 The 
“option” to return home is a cruel suggestion for many women who are fleeing 
because their lives were at risk in their home countries.174 Additionally, the DOJ 
failed to explain the different treatment of adult non-citizens in ICE detention, for 
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whom ICE facilitates transportation to an abortion appointment.175 
After Jane Doe won her victory, at least three other minors filed suit against 
the government in order to get a temporary release to travel to an abortion 
facility.176 All three won at the D.C. District Court, and though the government 
appealed one of the cases, it eventually dropped the appeal following the 
discovery that one of the girls was not properly under ORR custody because she 
was overage.177 
Women who are imprisoned have the same right to abortion as free 
women.178 Although the Hyde Amendment limits federal funding of abortion for 
both classes of women, prison officials cannot prevent an inmate from receiving 
an abortion.179 There is no principled legal reason for denying female immigrants 
who are civilly detained the same constitutional rights.180 
Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) brought many 
young and undocumented people out of the shadows and encouraged them to 
surrender their personal information to the government.181 The new 
administration’s enforcement priorities182 and repeal of DACA protections,183 
coupled with Congress’s failure to pass a bill to protect Dreamers,184 give 
undocumented and mixed-status families ample grounds to fear placement in 
detention centers pending removal hearings.185 Additionally, the Trump 
Administration is targeting immigrants in sanctuary cities, so there will 
undoubtedly be an increase in detained non-citizens.186 
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Unaccompanied minors suffer from several environmental stressors, such as 
poverty, racism, victimization, and physical abuse.187 The physical detention of 
minors and the separation from their families is traumatizing and can have a 
significant negative impact on their health.188 This makes the need to recognize a 
minor’s right to abortion, regardless of immigration status, all the more 
compelling and pressing.189 
The policy imposes an undue burden on minors’ ability to obtain an abortion 
and effectively denies them the right.190 Moreover, it serves no legitimate 
government interest when the state abortion laws are satisfied, i.e. the state has 
already had an opportunity to make a determination on the minor’s decision-
making capacity or the state presumes minors to be so capable.191 The individual 
minor’s privacy interest, however, is extremely pressing because she is 
physically detained and at the mercy of the federal government to facilitate her 
access to a safe abortion.192 Children are especially vulnerable to mental and 
psychological health problems as a result of being detained, making their privacy 
interest acutely important.193 
V.  A SIMPLE SOLUTION: PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION FOR UNACCOMPANIED 
MINORS TO ABORTION FACILITIES 
The Trump Administration has inherited a behemoth immigration 
enforcement apparatus and is using it to the fullest extent; not only are more 
immigrants being apprehended, they are being released at a much lower rate than 
before, leading to overcrowding and an increasing incentive to build more for-
profit detention centers, paid for with taxpayer money.194 
Immigration detention centers are often privately run and are costly to 
taxpayers.195 Lawmakers have been unable to repeal a 2009 bed quota that no 
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other law enforcement agency has, which exacerbates the cost of detention and 
the potential abuse of enforcement priorities.196 Although Obama began phasing 
out federal contracts with private detention companies that abused detainees and 
provided substandard medical care, Trump reversed this course.197 
Ensuring ORR covers the cost of transportation to abortion facilities or 
allows for outside arrangements to transport minors to abortion facilities is a 
simple and cost-effective solution.198 Opponents argue that allowing this kind of 
precedent will generate a wave of women fleeing to the border just to have 
United States citizens pay for their abortion.199 However, these fears are baseless 
and ignore the fact that ICE’s policy expressly states that the agency, like its 
federal sister agencies, will not pay for a detainee’s “elective” abortion.200 
Moreover, the federal government would not subsidize the cost of the abortion 
itself, rather it would only accommodate the transportation of the woman to the 
abortion facility.201 Indeed, the Hyde Amendment already prohibits the use of 
federal funds for abortion procedures except in limited cases of rape, incest, or to 
save the life of the mother.202  
Because the Hyde Amendment prevents taxpayer dollars from paying for 
abortion procedures for low-income women or women who depend on the 
government for health care, the potential cost to the government is miniscule.203 
The only expense would be transportation to and from the abortion facility, 
which could be a huge expense and burden to the undocumented woman or 
unaccompanied minor who has no support system in a country that is foreign to 
her.204 Moreover, the policy of facilitating transportation to and from an abortion 
appointment is something ORR has done in the past and should be well-equipped 
to do again.205 
The cost of providing transportation is negligible, especially considering the 
additional costs to the taxpayer if the minor is forced to carry the pregnancy to 
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term.206 The cost of providing transportation to an abortion facility should not be 
any higher than the current cost of transportation for the girl to receive pro-life 
counseling.207 Should the minor be detained for an extended period of time, 
services such as prenatal care, healthcare, and housing for the baby may be 
imposed on taxpayers as they are not exempted by the Hyde Amendment.208 
Additionally, in the case of Jane Doe, the ACLU did not request that ORR pay 
for transportation; rather, it requested the mere facilitation of transportation.209 In 
other words, the potential cost to taxpayers is zero.210 
On March 30, 2018, Judge Tanya Chutkan of the D.C. District Court 
certified a class of unaccompanied minors similarly situated to Jane Doe.211 The 
court also granted a temporary injunction to block ORR from continuing its non-
facilitation policy against minors in the Office’s custody.212 The government 
quickly filed a Motion for a Stay of the Preliminary Injunction, claiming the 
Judge’s order prevented ORR “from carrying out its statutory and custodial 
responsibilities by restricting its ability to involve the minor’s parents and notify 
authorized medical personnel as it deems necessary, and it requires ORR to 
facilitate abortions of unaccompanied alien children . . . in its care.”213 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Women, especially women who are non-native, detained, and/or minors, are 
constant targets of patriarchal reproductive policies.214 From the eugenics of 
forced sterilization to the abortion ban for detained non-citizen minors, women’s 
privacy rights and reproductive autonomy have been repeatedly violated.215 Girls 
in removal proceedings face the loss of liberty when they are kept in detention 
facilities and denied access to adequate medical care.216 The new policy of the 
Office of Refugee Resettlement that refuses to facilitate a minor’s transportation 
to an abortion appointment effectively vetoes her choice over her reproductive 
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Now is the time to recognize that every woman in every state, regardless of 
immigration status or age, has a constitutionally protected right to abortion.218 A 
policy that imposes an undue burden on that right, such as requiring parental 
consent instead of a court order, mandating religious-based anti-abortion 
counseling, or refusing to transport a detainee to an abortion facility, is plainly 
unconstitutional.219 
 
“I am not free while any woman is unfree, even when her shackles are 
very different from my own.”  
                                                            —Audre Lorde220 
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